This paper explores the ways in which the proposed new Land and Building Tax bill could be used to increase local government revenue and reduce wealth inequality in Thailand while rationalizing the current system of land taxes. After comparing the current system to the new proposed system, it finds that the new bill would be fairer, as it would be a more reasonable tax rate, and more broadly (and fairly) collected, and would do so based on current land values, not the values calculated in 1981. Additionally, by having the tax collected and used at a local level, it would promote fiscal decentralization and local governmental accountability.

This paper provides a simple theoretical model that explains a mechanism for which market economy might proliferate through various geographical locations in the early Rattanakosin Siam and its implication on locational inequality. The proliferation of market economy is often facilitated by a widespread network of merchants and the elite’s profit-maximisation trade incentives. The degree of market expansion in each city depends on elite’s benefits from the market and geographical location of the city. The results suggest four factors that contribute to the level of inequality both within and between cities: social structure, geographical location, individual’s connection with powerful elites and worker’s ability.

The objective of this paper is to investigate the potential household income effect on public and private health care choices for outpatient and inpatient services. A multinomial logit model on choice of health care services is estimated using the Health and Welfare Survey 2006 data from Thailand with information on the number of hospitals and doctors in each province. The results indicate that an increase in monthly household income has an impact on the likelihood of healthcare utilization. Income elasticity for outpatient services is approximately 0.17 and 0.21 at clinics and private hospitals respectively. Income elasticity for inpatient services is approximately 0.10 at public provincial hospitals and 0.25 at private hospitals. The positive income elasticity indicates that services at these healthcare providers are a necessity. In contrast, income elasticity is approximately -0.13 and -0.20 for outpatient and inpatient services at public district hospitals. This suggests that district hospitals may be an inferior good. This implies that patients from wealthier families are more likely to visit private hospitals or public provincial hospitals. The Universal Coverage or Gold Card beneficiaries show a positive statistically significant probability of visiting public district hospitals for outpatient and inpatient services. From the policy perspective, Universal Coverage or Gold Card plan should be designed for segments of population below a certain income level. The government can use funds that made available by the decreased number of Universal Coverage or Gold Card beneficiaries to raise the capitation rate or hire additional medical staff at district hospitals.

This research article considers a simulated scenario in which there exists policy infrastructure that promotes employment options to support desirable life after retirement with fiscal sustainability. Two proposed “demo” policy tools, among many others, include (1) legislative flexibility in employment and (2) tax incentives for employers. These measures aim at encouraging employment structure with working conditions favorable for elderly workers. The results of the simulation imply that, given suitable working conditions, a minimum of 50% of the potential elderly workforce participating in the market can yield marginal annual income of approximately 44,268 - 165,295 Baht per elderly worker and approximately 4.74 - 9.35% GDP increase from the baseline GDP growth with ageing population structure. Moreover, the estimated possible minimum marginal net tax revenue is approximately 33,279- 65,994 million Baht. This marginal government revenue, if allocated to old-age expenditure, amounts to approximately 4,000 Baht per elderly per year. The proposed scenario with policy infrastructure that encourages elderly labor participation in the economy constitutes a self-funded model with fiscal sustainability and represents a win-win scenario. Nevertheless, the success of implementing such policy tools depends on the understanding, co-operation and synchronization among the Thai public institutions as well as all parts of the society.