Traditionally, Schopenhauer’s philosophy is often introduced emphasizing its opposition to Hegel ("anti-Hegelianism") and sometimes seen as some kind of reaction to Hegel’s system, being therefore indebted to it in some measure. This article shows that the available documents about the beginnings of Schopenhauer’s relation to Hegel make such hypothesis untenable; moreover, they can give the researchers a frame of reference and several clues for a better understanding of Schopenhauer’s further discussion with Hegelianism.

In Hegel’s philosophy, both truth and genuine freedom belong to the domain of the Idea. Life, as it is categorized in the Science of Logic, is the first form and stage of the Idea, and is therefore essential for a comprehension of truth and self-determination. In this paper, I explore why and to what extent Life is self-determining and true. Considering what Hegel considers to be the three fundamental features of all life, I explain how life is self-determining with respect to its organic unity, relationship with the other, and reproductive process. I explicate how the living individual develops and sustains the collective unity of its objectivity, distinguishes itself from its other, yet sustains and regenerates itself through it, and how it raises its universal identity beyond its particular existence through reproduction.

The aim of this article is to discuss the objection of vicious circularity concerning the relation between the Phenomenology of Spiritand the Science of Logic. My argument is articulated in three stages: (i) in the first place, I will provide a historical reconstruction of the debate and I will try to neutralize the objection of vicious circularity; (ii) in the second place, I will examine the latest positions of the Hegel-Forschungabout the issue of a possibly reciprocal presupposition between the PhG and the SL; (iii) in the third place, I will analyze the meaning of a virtuous circularity, by showing its inner relation to a dynamic conception of systematicity.

The aim of this article is to discuss the objection of vicious circularity concerning the relation between the Phenomenology of Spiritand the Science of Logic. My argument is articulated in three stages: (i) in the first place, I will provide a historical reconstruction of the debate and I will try to neutralize the objection of vicious circularity; (ii) in the second place, I will examine the latest positions of the Hegel-Forschungabout the issue of a possibly reciprocal presupposition between the PhG and the SL; (iii) in the third place, I will analyze the meaning of a virtuous circularity, by showing its inner relation to a dynamic conception of systematicity.

O debate teológico presente no Stift de Tübingen é campo de recepção da filosofia kantiana por meio de uma questão específica: aquela da existência de Deus e de Sua revelação aos homens. Reconstruindo-o tangencialmente, pode-se sublinhar qual a posição que a filosofia kantiana ocupa nele, salientando-a frente àquela de Storr e Flatt. Também, apontar para a apropriação dela no seio daquele debate. Assim, quando se volta para a posição de Hegel, nota-se que ele se contrapõe à apropriação teológica de Kant, posicionando-se de modo similar ao kantiano. Tem-se aqui um liame entre Kant e aquilo que se chama, incipientemente, de filosofia hegeliana.