This article intends to show how the “sophists,” in their argument with the “philosophers” in Plato’s Gorgias, appropriate the concept of childhood. The goal here is to think how the imputation of the “childish” to the other's discourse, sophist or philosopher, is a key point in the establishment of a victory of one discourse over the other in the history of western thinking. The paper also intends to present the differences between the sophistic and philosophical conceptions of childhood, showing, however, that the discursive goals of these different conceptions aim at the same end point: to make the other assume a status of heteronomy and, therefore, to accept being taught by the victorious discourse—in this case, the one that presumes itself to be adult, not-childish. I begin by locating the notion of childhood in a wider conceptual context than is usual, then consider what it means to “talk like a child” from this more expansive conceptual perspective. I then turn to the Gorgias, and present the concept of childhood as representative of the disqualified argument in the political dispute in Plato’s dialogue over the place of the teacher. I then discuss two conceptions of childhood in the dialogue: the philosophical one, which intends to show how rhetoric deludes itself; and the sophistic one, which intends to show how philosophy is a form of fantasizing. I also analyze two images commonly associated with children in the dialogue’s confrontation of ideas: the image of the “bogeyman,” and the image of play and gaming--the first imputed by sophists to philosophers, and the second imputed by philosophers to sophists. Finally, I address the platonic political-pedagogical project’s need for a concept of childhood as heteronomous, and consider whether this need is or is not a mark of all political-pedagogical projects, and indeed of all political discussion between contesting discourses.

This text focuses on the idea that philosophical inquiry can be understood as a practice for social development as far as a real social development requires a qualitative change in the way society carries out its activities, such as through more progressive and more reflective attitudes and behavior by the population, the adoption of more democratic and participative social forms of organization, the use of more advanced technology, and the dissemination and circulation of more advanced forms of knowledge. Philosophical inquiry is, indeed, a powerful means of spreading intelligence in all the contexts of associated life; since it enhances human intellectual potential through sound reflection both on human experiences as well as on the beliefs, understandings, values which frame and give meaning to these experiences. This practice requires and promotes contexts of shared meanings as well as contexts of social development, aiming at: clarification of ideas; construction of new meanings; and development of new interpretative perspectives of reality. In these terms it can be acknowledged as a social development device for the construction of new ideas and the transformation and emancipation of individuals and social groups as it introduces and enhances reflection in different fields of associated living. The outcomes of philosophical inquiry are, by consequence, new ideas, values, and actions (rationally oriented) that can make for a new sense of, and construct a new understanding of human experience, indicating new developmental directions to human societies.

This analysis shows how P4C can be used as a tool to enhance greater intercultural sensitivity. A group of young Maltese university seekers and teenage unaccompanied minor asylum seekers engaged in dialogic inquiry, in the process changing the way in which they see their individual subjective identities. The analysis moves away from the application of P4C in formal educational settings and also moves away from its application in childhood settings. In this manner, it aspires to advance knowledge of how P4C can be creatively applied to generate such values as understanding, empathy, dialogue, acceptance of self and others, and sharing. It also shows how people can heal certain past hurts through sharing and also help them to generate hope of a brighter future. Their formation into a community of inquiry is an outward manifestation of their inner quest for a greater understanding of their own realities and their desire to understand people of other cultures. Through providing an account based on listening to the voices of the young asylum seekers, the analysis is informed by the transience of lived experiences and the youthfulness of the asylum seekers. It is based on an inter-disciplinary blend of psychoanalytic, socio-cultural, and philosophical thinking.

This contribution presents a research developed in 2007, based on the data gathered during the first Italian meeting of Philosophy for Children which took place in Padua, with the collaboration of the University of Padua. The application forms and the proposals made during the meeting have been used to draw some guide lines of the Italian P4C outline. It is important to underline that this inquiry does not pretend to be complete because some teachers were not able to be present at the meeting and because members of Italian P4C community are increasing every year. For these reasons the portrait presented, even if useful and careful in our opinion, is not complete. The aim of this paper is to describe the different training courses that are present in Italy and that are officially recognized by the Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children (IAPC) and by the International Council for Philosophical Inquiry with Children (ICPIC), and to present a variety of experiences that were realized in Italian regions in 2006/2007.

It is common to say that we leave infancy when, with the passing of time, very different experiences are produced in us, causing us to mature and, in this way, lead us into adulthood; in other words, we could say that infancy ends when, as time passes, we accumulate and live our different experiences. In this sense, two observations come to mind and make us think about the relations between time, infancy, and experience. Victor Hugo and Picasso offered the following concise phrases: “Infancy begins when time brings experience” (Victor Hugo); and “…when I was twelve, I painted like an adult, and I spent my entire lifetime learning how to paint like a child” (Picasso). This text proposes a reflection on these themes, observing them through the universes of education, philosophy, and psychology, and founded in the ideas of Walter Benjamin, Giorgio Agamben, Comenius, Augustine, and others. Beginning with a political-philosophical reflection on the concept of infancy, we move toward philosophy, and from there, toward an etymological discussion that circumscribes the theme of linguistics and ends with politics. We are invited to contemplate: what is this infancy we produce, and what practices of power do we create in our relations with the infantile? For this reflexive journey, we turn to the discussions of Walter Benjamin and Giorgio Agamben regarding the concept of experience, which lead us to an idea of experience as a route, a crossing, a path to be followed, i.e something that is not given, that is uncertain. Based on this notion, we can link the ideas of infancy and of experience, and both of these to a perspective of opening and to the yet-to-come, the unfinished. In this reflection, we find in St. Augustine spaces for thinking about time as temporality. Amalgamating this reflection on infancy and time with the notion of experience put forth by Benjamin (1987) and Agamben (2005, 2007), other views and possibilities are produced regarding the themes presented by education in the context of new educational practices with children.